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ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IN ISRAEL
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
RICHARD GLADSTEIN*

I. INTRODUCTION

Administrative detention in any form curtails civil liberties. Yet
the vast majority of countries use administrative detention in times of
perceived national emergency.' In an enduring state of crisis, Israel
has enacted an administrative detention statute designed to safeguard
the security of the state and the due process rights of detainees. This
occupied
comment will examine preventive detention in Israel and the
2
law.
international
and
Israeli
of
context
territories in the
Administrative detention refers to the confinement of individuals
by the executive branch of government for imperative security reasons. 3 Such detention frequently involves more flexible rules of procedure, evidence, conviction,4 and sentencing than those applied in
normal criminal proceedings.
II. HISTORICAL OvRvIEw
The State of Israel has existed in emergency circumstances since
its establishment. In November 1947, the United Nations General
* Antioch School of Law, J.D. 1981; Temple University School of Law, Summer Session,
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1980; Oberlin College, B.A. 1977.
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979, Report
Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives and Committee
on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1979 State Department Report].
2 The "occupied territories" consist of the lands controlled by Israel as a result of the 1967
War: The Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza district, and the West Bank of the
Jordan River (Judaea, Samaria, and East Jerusalem). 1979 State Department Report, supra note
1, at 760. The terms "administered" and "occupied" territories will be used interchangeably
since the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza has not been finally resolved. The cases of
Rabbi Meir Kahane and the Hebron area mayors will also be discussed.
3 The terms "administrative" and "preventive" detention in their broadest sense mean the
confinement of individuals without criminal convictions. Preventive detention thus includes
involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, confinement of material witnesses, internment of
aliens pending immigration proceedings, and imprisonment of criminal defendants before trial.
This comment will focus, however, on the detention of suspected terrorists, and combatants for
imperative reasons of national security. See generally Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A
Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 1277 (1973); Bracha, Restriction of Personal Freedom Without Due Process of Law According to the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations, 1945, 8 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights [hereinafter cited as
I.Y.H.R.] 296 (1978).
4 For example, the courts often admit hearsay evidence when the executive claims cross-examination will jeopardize its sources. Hadar, Administrative Detentions Employed by Israel, 1
I.Y.H.R. 283 (1971).

88

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:87

Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine into Jewish and
Arab States. On May 15, 1948, the day after Israel issued its Declaration of Independence from Great Britain, the armed forces of Egypt,
Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon invaded to prevent the establishment of the new State. The Jordanian army seized Judaea,
Samaria, and East Jerusalem where it established a military administration. In the Spring of 1949, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria
entered into Armistice Agreements with Israel.- Toward the mid-fifties, Israel's security problems multipled. In 1956, Israel fought Egypt
in the Gaza district and the Sinai Peninsula." In the early and
mid-sixties, Israeli forces took reprisals for attacks on Jewish settlements by Arab guerrilla bands. In 1967, Israeli Defense Forces occupied the West Bank, Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, and the Gaza
7
district as a result of the Six Day War against Egypt and Jordan.
Until 1967, Israel's major cities were several miles from the confrontation states. From 1969 to 1970, hostilities between Egypt and Israel
continued on the Suez front. In 1973, Israel repelled a surprise invasion by Egypt and Syria. 8 After four wars, none of the twenty-two
Arab League nations, except Egypt, has officially accepted Israel's
right to exist within mutually agreed upon "secure and recognized
boundaries." 9
Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has led to increased terrorism against Israeli citizens. In July 1968, the Palestine
National Council, comprised of representatives of various Arab and
Palestinian organizations, adopted the Palestine National Covenant,
- The land known as Palestine in 1900 is now divided into three parts: Israel proper, the
West Bank (Judaea, Samaria, East Jerusalem) and Jordan. After World War I, the League of
Nations conveyed a Mandate for Palestine to Great Britain. According to the Mandate, Britain
was responsible for both promoting a "Jewish National Home" and protecting the civil and
religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine. In 1922, Britain separated the East Bank
portion of Palestine, termed Trans-Jordan, from the West Bank. As a result, about seventy-five
percent of the initial Palestine Mandate became the Kingdom of Jordan. Palestine, 17 Encyclopaedia Britannica 168-171 (14th ed. 1973); Israel, 12 Encyclopaedia Britannica 698-700 (14th
ed. 1973); Pach, Human Rights in West Bank Military Courts, 7 I.Y.H.R. 222, 224 (1970). Prior
to 1948, the term "Palestinian" referred to both Arab and Jewish citizens of Palestine. Since
1948, it has connoted Palestinian Arabs residing inside and outside of the State of Israel, Some
Arab citizens of Israel identify themselves as Israeli Arabs; others consider themselves Palestinians.
6 Israel, 12 Encyclopaedia Britannica 698-700 (14th ed. 1973).
7 On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 242, requiring the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The
Resolution called for, inter alia, the acknowledgement of the sovereignty, integrity, and independence of every state in the area within secure and recognized boundaries; and withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict. Id.
8 The United Nations Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 338, which
required an immediate cease-fire and the implementation of Resolution 242. S.C. Res. 338, 28
U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1974).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967, S.C. Res. 242, 22
U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22 Rev. 2 (1967).
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which advocates armed struggle as the only way to liberate Palestine
from the Zionist entity.' 0 The Palestine Liberation Organization
(P.L.O.) has recently sought to persuade the Western world of its
willingness to accept a political solution providing for an independent
Palestinian State. But the expressions of the P.L.O. to the Arab nations have remained the same. On June 1, 1980, for example, Al
Fatah, the military branch of the P.L.O., issued a major policy
declaration calling on Palestinians to destroy the Jewish State through
armed revolution. Subsequently, P.L.O. spokesmen disavowed the
declaration to foreign correspondents." On January 28, 1981, "Moslem leaders from 37 nations and the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . [issued] the Mecca Declaration asserting that the 'prime
Islamic cause of this generation' shall be preparing for a ihad, or holy
war, 'with all the means at our disposal' to liberate East Jerusalem
and all the Israeli-occupied Arab lands." 12 The causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict lie deep in European and Middle Eastern history. Regardless of the origins of this conflict, the state of emergency continues. "3
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND OTHER COUNTRIES

Countries tend to employ administrative detention in times of
perceived national emergency. Two-thirds of the nations in the world

10Palestine

National Covenant, July 1968, Palestine National Council, art. 9, reprinted in 3

J. Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1085-1091 (1974).
1 Fatah GuerrillasMeet in Syria Amid Heightened Anti-Israeli Feeling, N.Y. Times, May
23, 1980, § 1, at 3 col 1; Gage, P.L.O. Softens Stand Challenging Israel, N.Y. Times, June 7,
1980, § 1, at 3, col. 1; Gage, GuerrillasLook Again to Jordan as Base for Strikes Against Israel,
N.Y. Times, June 10, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
1 Ottaway, Islamic Group to Boycott Israel, Wasington Post, January 29, 1981, § A, at 1,
col. 5.
'3 The Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (March 26, 1979) represent a substantial initiative toward achieving a just and lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The Accords and Treaty provide for normalization of relations between Egypt and
Israel, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula, and negotiations (among
representatives of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians) toward autonomy for the Palestinians living in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Camp David Agreements, September 17, 1978,
Egypt-Israel-United States. 17 Int'l Legal Materials 1463 (1978). Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty,
March 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel-United States, 18 Int'l Legal Materials 362 (1979). Although the
Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty represent a promising beginning,
the recent confrontation between Israel and Syria over Syrian surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon
and the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor illustrate the continuing volatility of Arab-Israeli relations. Gupte, Syrians Said to Lean to Wider Role for Other Arabs in Lebanese Force,
N.Y. Times, May 24, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 4; Begin's Bombshell, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1981, § 4,
at 1, col. 1.

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:87

practice some form of preventive confinement according to the Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1979, prepared by the
Department of State. In the vast majority of these cases preventive
detention is related to the nation's domestic or foreign conflict. Most
nations that prohibit administrative detention are not burdened by
extreme internal or external crises. The 1979 State Department Report
indicates that twenty-six countries in the Near East, North Africa, and
South Asia use some kind of administrative detention, while one
country (Egypt) does not. In contrast, in the more secure countries of
Europe and North America, the Report maintains that twelve countries employ preventive detention; eighteen others prohibit the
practice. 13a
Much of Israel's legal system derives from British law. In Britain,
the absence of a written constitution and the supremacy of Parliament
permit the suspension of personal freedoms in times of crisis. 14 Acting
on the assumption that individual liberty was gravely threatened in
Northern Ireland, the Parliament recently passed two statutes. The
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973 pertains only to
Northern Ireland, while the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act of 1976 pertains to the entire United Kingdom. The
European Commission on Human Rights held that detention under
these laws did not violate procedural due process because it was
"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" under article 15(i)
15
of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The United States has also authorized administrative detention
during times of perceived public crisis. Article 1, section 9 of the
Constitution allows the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
"... . when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it." The suspension of the writ permits a form of administrative detention since such suspension deprives defendates of their normal rights to challenge unlawful detention. On September 15, 1863,
President Lincoln, empowered by Congress, suspended the writ of
habeas corpus in cases involving offenses against the military. In Ex
ParteMilligan, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the executive to suspend the writ in times of "great crisis," but also condemned
16
the use of military tribunals when civilian courts are available.
1979 State Department Report, supra note 1.
11 G. Wilson, Cases on Constitutional and Administrative Law 225-286, 641-652 (2d ed.
1976); See also Great Britain, 10 Encyclopaedia Britannica 736, 738-739 (14th ed. 1973).
Is In 1978, the European Court on Human Rights affirmed this point of view. In 1979,
Parliament renewed both laws. Although the Northern Ireland Standing Advisory Commission
on Human Rights (the Bennett Committee) has recommended reforms in the laws, it has not
advocated their abolition. 1979 State Department Report, supra note 1, at 694.
16Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 (1866).
131
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One means of comparing administrative detention in various
countries is by the standard of proof required for confinement. Countries have based confinement on no prior acts, suspicion of past offenses, and proof of actual crimes. Many countries, including Great
Britain and Israel, authorize detention of individuals suspected of
prior offenses. During World War II, however, the United States
without regard
directed the mass confinement of Japanese-Americans
7
to their prior actions, loyalties, citizenship, or age.'
In September 1942, President Roosevelt, authorized by Congress,
issued Executive Order No. 9066 requiring the detention of the whole
West Coast population of Japanese-Americans as a protection against
espionage and sabotage. Approximately 110,000 persons of Japanese
origin were forced to reside in detention camps until the end of the
War. In Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed
executive orders evacuating Japanese-Americans and implicitly approved other orders confining them for the duration of the War. 8 The
Court thus rationalized the uncritical detention of an entire racial
group without regard to prior acts for perceived reasons of national
security.
In 1950, the United States Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act (which was repealed in 1971) to combat the alleged world
communist menace. The statute authorized the Attorney General in
times of "internal security emergency" to apprehend and detain any
person who was likely to engage in, or likely to conspire with others to
engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage. Evidence of espionage or
sabotage included membership in the Communist Party of the United
States after January 1, 1949.1"
Although the United States no longer has an administrative detention statute to confine suspected saboteurs and spies, several other
forms of preventive detention remain. For example, the nation used
pre-trial detention to incarcerate at least 50,000 criminal defendants
in 1978.20 In addition, sections 235 and 242 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act provide for the administrative detention of aliens
21
pending admission or deportation proceedings.
7 Dershowitz, supra note 3, at 1282-1286.
18 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
19

Under the Act the Attorney General was required to bring the suspect before a prelimi-

nary hearing officer in forty-eight hours. If the hearing officer found probable cause, the
individual had a right to appeal to the Detention Review Board, and then to the United States
court of appeals. Emergency Detention Act of 1950, ch. 1024, §§ 1-116, 64 Stat. 1019 (repealed
1971).
20 Law Enforement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice,
"Census of Jails and Survey of Jail Inmates," No. SD-NPS-J6P (February 1979).
21 Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 235, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1252 (1952). Most recently, in
Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the United States Court of Appeals held that
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ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION UNDER ISRAELI LAW

The Israeli legal system, as noted previously, has evolved largely
from the British legal system.2 2 In Israel, as in the British parliamentary system, legislation is the supreme legal norm. Executive actions
are subject to judicial review, but statutes are not subject to such
control. 23 Constitutional principles guide the Israeli legal system
even though no single instrument enjoys superior or comprehensive
legal status. These principles derive from natural law, international
human rights agreements, the Palestine Orders in Council, the Basic
Laws of the Israeli Parliament (hereinafter the Knesset), the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, and case law. The
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel proclaims the
principles of freedom, justice, peace, equality, tolerance, and adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. Although the Knesset has
not yet enacted a formal Bill of Rights, it is considering the passage of
a Bill entitled Basic Law: Rights of the Person and Citizen. 24 Section
4 of the Bill provides: "Every person has the right to personal liberty;
that right shall not be denied by means of imprisonment, arrest,
deportation, expulsion, extradition, or any other means, save according to a law and pursuant to procedure prescribed by law."
Israeli law authorizes preventive confinement as an extraordinary measure in a minority of security cases. In most instances, normal criminal procedures are believed to be adequate. Former Defense
Minister Shimon Peres has indicated that Israel placed an average of
forty individuals per year under administrative detention from 1967
the above Act authorized the Attorney General to subject all Iranian students who failed to
comply with reporting requirements to deportation proceedings. Query whether the courts
would have upheld the authority of the Attorney General to detain Iranian students pending
deportation if any of the fifty-two American hostages had been killed in Iran.
22 The legislative bills of the State of Israel are published in the Hatza'otHok. The statutes of
the State of Israel are printed in the Sefer Ha-Chukkin. The statutes of the State of Israel are
translated from the Hebrew in the Laws of the State oj Israel. The decisions of the Supreme
Court of Israel are published in Piskei Din. A small minority of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Israel are translated into English in the Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of
Israel.
21 H.C. 98/69 (an application to the Supreme Court sitting in its role as the High Court of
Justice), Bergmann v. Minister of Finance, 23 Piskei Din [hereinafter cited as P.D.] (I) 693. The
Bergmann case represents an exception to this rule. There, the Supreme Court struck down the
Campaign Financing Law (1969) as incompatible with the principle of equality in Section 4 of
the Basic Law: Knesset. The law unfairly discriminated against new political parties, since it
only provided government funding to parties with seats in the outgoing Knesset. Construed in
Nimmer, The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel's Quest for a Constitution, 5 Isr. L. Rev. 1217
1221-1223 (1970).
24 (1972/73) Hatza'ot Hok (Legislative Bills of the State of Israel) (No. 1085) 448, quoted in
Shapiro-Libai, Freedomfrom Arbitrary Detention: Israel Law in Light of InternationalInstruments, 2 I.Y.H.R. 335, 336 (1974).
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to 1976.25 At the end of 1977, the Israeli government held about
twenty administrative detainees according to the 1977 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, prepared by the Department of
State. In July 1978, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs indicated
there were twenty-one detainees. 26 As of November 1979, Israeli
authorities held fifteen individuals under preventive confinement ac1979,
cording to the 1979 State Department Report.2 7 In December
28
detainees.
twenty-three
listed
Israel
the Attorney General of
A. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations
The law governing administrative detention in Israel developed
from a variety of Defense Regulations (108-112B, 125) promulgated
by the British mandatory government in Palestine in 1945. Regulation
108 set forth the grounds justifying detention: "An order for detention
may be made if, in the opinion of the Military Commander, it is
necessary and expedient for securing the public safety, defense of
Palestine, the maintenance of public order, or the suppression of
mutiny, rebellion or riot." 29 These regulations were based on Article
6 of the Palestine (Defense) Orders in Council, 1937, passed in Britain
before World War 11.30 Article 6(2) granted the High Commissioner
far-reaching powers. In particular, article 6(2)(d) provided that the
"Defense Regulations could amend any law, suspend the operation of
any law, and apply any law with or without modification." 3' The
promulgation of the 1945 Defense Regulations generated intense critithe Regulations as decism from the Jewish community, which saw
32
statehood.
for
struggle
signed to suppress its
After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Knesset
incorporated the Defense Regulations into Israeli law through section
25 National Lawyers Guild, Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and
Gaza, 82 (1978).
26Dickstein, Minority Report of the National Lawyers Guild on the Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied Territories, 5 (1978).
27 1979 State Department Report, supra note 1, at 763.
28 Amnesty International, Report and Recommendations of an Amnesty International Mission to the Government of the State of Israel, Amnesty International Publications (1980) (Reply
of the Israeli Government at 68).
29 The Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945: 3 Government of Palestine Ordinances.
Rules, Orders, Notices, Annual Volume for 1945, pp. 1058-1098, at 1082.
30The Palestine (Defense) Order in Council, 1937: 2 Government of Palestine Ordinances.
Rules, Orders, Notices, Annual Volume for 1937, pp. 206-265, at 261.
31 Id. at 262.

32Many Israelis, including Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, were detained under these
regulations. See also the protest of the Federation of Hebrew Lawyers, February 7, 1946, 3
Hapraklit1, 58 (1946) [Law Journal of the Israel Bar Association].
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11 of the Law and Administrative Ordinance. 33 The Israeli Parliament granted the Prime Minister the same extensive powers formerly
possessed by the High Commissioner. Although the Knesset adopted
these regulations, it imposed more stringent procedures for enacting
new defense regulations. For instance, section 9 of the Ordinance
required the termination of a new emergency rules three months after
their enactment, absent their extension by law.
Under the Israeli Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1948, the
detention power of the Military Commanders was limited by three
organizational bodies.3 4 The first of these bodies was controlled by
internal instructions issued by the Israeli Defense Forces (hereinafter
I.D.F.).3 5 The guidelines, inter alia, permitted the Chief of Staff to
issue an order of detention only after obtaining a recommendation
from an advisory committee composed of representatives of the military agencies, chaired by the Military Advocate General. The second
body functioned after the issuance of the detention order and was
governed by Defense Regulation 111 (4). Regulation 111 (4) established
advisory committees which heard objections to detention orders and
made recommendations to the Chief of Staff. The committees were
appointed by the Minister of Defense and chaired by a Justice of the
Israeli Supreme Court. Although the committees only submitted recommendations, military authorities considered these recommendations binding. The third body that reviewed and still reviews detention orders is the Israeli Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, sitting
as the High Court of Justice, can issue writs of mandamus. The role of
the Supreme Court in safeguarding the due process rights of detainees
will be examined below.
On March 6, 1979, the Knesset enacted the Emergency Powers
(Detention) Law, thereby repealing Regulations 85(1)(j) and 111112B of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1948.36 The Emer31 The Law and Administrative Ordinances, 5708, 1948: 1 Laws of the State of Israel,
Annual Volume for 1948, No. 1 of 5708, at 9. Section 11 of this Ordinance provides:
The law which existed in Palestine on 5 Iyor, 5708 (14th May 1948) shall remain in
force, insofar as there is nothing therein repugnant to this Ordinance or to other laws
which may be enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of the State, and
subject to such modification as may result from the establishment of the State and its
authorities.
34 The term "Military Commanders" refers to the Commanders of the three military regions,
the Commander of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff. Hadar, supra note 4, at 284.
3- These instructions provide mandatory guidelines to the armed forces for implementing the
Defense (Emergency) Regulations. They are not published; however, their substance can be
found in Instructions of the Attorney General, Instruction 21.927, paras. 8-9. Construed in
Bracha, supra note 3, at 306; see also Hadar, supra note 4, at 284-286.
36 Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 1979: Passed by the Knesset on the 6th Adar, 5739
(5th March 1979) and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkin No. 930 of the 14th Adar; 5739 (13th
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gency Powers Law, 1979, substantially restricts the use of preventive
detention as formerly permitted under British mandatory regulations.
The new law limits the power to detain to times of emergency as
declared by the Knesset. It also transfers most power to confine from
military to civilian authorities, and significantly strengthens judicial
review.
B. Comparison Between The Defense Regulations
And The Emergency Powers Law
The Israeli Emergency Powers Law (1979), which replaced the
British Defense Regulations 111-112B (1945), provides greater due
process protection for administrative detainees. Section 1 of the new
law precludes administrative detention unless the Knesset pronounces
a state of emergency. The Defense Regulations did not require the
Knesset to declare a state of emergency as a prerequisite to imposing
detention. The new law also transfers the power to detain from
military to civilian authorities, that is from the Military Commander
to the Defense Minister. Section 2 of the new law authorizes the
Defense Minister to detain an individual for a period not exceeding six
months, with possible extension for the same length of time. The
Chief of Staff is permitted to confine a person for forty-eight hours
with no possibility of extension. In contrast, Defense Regulation 111
authorized a Military Commander to detain any individual for a
period not exceeding one year. The internal instructions of the Israeli
Defense Forces (I.D.F.), however, limited the power of the Military
Commander to detain the individual to one month periods, whether
in single or successive orders.37 The Chief of Staff could confine an
individual for as many as six months if he obtained the recommendation of an advisory committee. 38 Section 3 of the new law authorizes
a policeman or soldier to serve an order of detention upon a detainee.
Defense Regulation 112(B) permitted the same officials to arrest and
detain an individual without a warrant for seven days while the
competent authority determined whether to issue an order. Both section 8(a) of the new law and internal I.D.F. instructions provide
defendants with the right to representation by counsel. Section 8(a) of
the new law also affords the detainee the right to be present and heard
in the proceedings against him. In contrast, the Defense Regulations
March 1979), 76; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in Hatza'ot Chok No. 1360 of
5738, 294. The statute has not been published yet in Laws oj the State of Israel.
"TBracha, supra note 3 at 307; The Defense Emergency Regulations, 1945, supra note 29, at
1083.
8

Id.
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did not entitle the defendant to attend the hearing of the advisory
3
committee.
The grounds justifying detention are similar under section 2(a) of
the Emergency Powers Law and section 108 of the Defense Regulations. Section 2(a), however, establishes an objective standard for
determining the validity of detention while section 108 of the Defense
Regulations provided a subjective test. Under the new law, the Defense Minister or Chief of Staff must have reasonable grounds for
believing that the safety of the State or the public requires issuance of
an order. Under the old law, the Military Commander had discretion
to order detention whenever he deemed confinement necessary or
expedient. The legislative history of section 2(a) of the new law emphasizes that detention may not be used unless it is the only means of
achieving security. 40 Although section 108 of the Defense Regulations
failed to articulate an objective standard for assessing the validity of
detention, the I.D.F. instructions permitted the Military Commander
to use administrative detention only as a last resort in situations likely
4
to incite violence. 1
The rules of evidence established by the Emergency Powers Law
bear a closer resemblance to the evidentiary rules applied in normal
criminal proceedings than do the rules created by the Defense Regulations or the I.D.F. Yet section 6(a) of the new law allows the District
Court President to diverge from the rules of evidence ". . . to facilitate the discovery of truth and the doing of justice." In addition,
section 6(c) enables the President to obtain evidence in the absence of
the detainee or his representative, without revealing its contents,
when the judge is convinced disclosure will threaten the security of
the State or public.
The Emergency Powers Law requires more judicial review of
confinement than that required by the Defense (Emergency) Regulations. Section 4 of the law recently passed by the Knesset mandates
judicial review by a district court. In contrast, Defense Regulation
111(4), repealed by the new law, mandated administrative review by
a military advisory committee. Section 4(a) orders the Defense Minister or Chief of Staff to bring the detainee before the President of the
District Court within forty-eight hours of confinement. The District
Court President has the authority to ratify, void, or modify the deten-

" Bracha, supra note 3, at 306, 321.
40 Id. at 320.
41 Id. at 308.
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tion. If a detainee is not presented before the court as stipulated, he
must be released at the end of forty-eight hours. Section 4(c) empowers the District Court President to nullify the order if the detainee
proves the reasons for confinement involve irrelevant considerations
or lack of good faith. According to section 5 of the new law, the
ratification of detention, with or without change, must be reviewed
by the district court no later than three months after confinement. If
the President fails to review the order, the detainee must be released.
Thus, under the Emergency Powers Law, the district courts perform
the functions previously performed by the advisory committees under
the Defense Regulations. Section 7 of the new law maintains the right
of the detainee to subject the intermediate level decision to Supreme
Court review.
C. Administrative Detention In The Occupied Territories
A somewhat different system of administrative detention applies
in the occupied territories. In the territories administered by Israel,
preventive detention is authorized chiefly by Article 87 of the Order
Concerning Security Instructions, based on the Defense Regulations,
1948. Article 87 was promulgated by the Military Commanders in the
West Bank and Gaza after the 1967 War and is supplemented by the
internal I.D.F. instructions discussed above. 42 The Israeli government is in the process of developing regulations that will apply the
new Emergency Powers Law to the territories. 43 Article 87 empowers Military Commanders to administratively detain any individual, but internal army regulations limit the authority of the Military
Commanders in a number of ways. For example, only a specific
military agency can issue or extend a detention order. Normally, the
first period of confinement cannot exceed one month. When a military agency requests the extention of an order for over three months,
the order must be approved by the Area Commander. The standards
for issuing a detention order in the occupied territories are the same as
those applied in Israel under the Emergency Powers Law involving
44
considerations of national security.
Three organizational bodies are also responsible for regulating
administrative detention in the occupied territories. Article 87 of the
'2 Supra note 35.

43 Amnesty Report, supra note 28, at 68; see also 1979 State Department Report, supra note
1, at 760.
44 Hadar, supra note 4, at 287. The State of Israel Ministry of Defense, Coordinator of
Government Operations in Judea, Samaria, Gaza, Sinai, Golan Heights, A Twelve Year Survey
1967-1979, at 10-11 (October 1979).
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Security Order requires review of confinement by two advisory committees. The first committee, known as the area advisory committee,
is responsible for initial review. It is established by the Area Commander and convenes at least three times a year. All requests for
confinement or its continuation for a period exceeding nine months
must be made before the committee. After the body hears oral and
written evidence, it makes recommendations to the Area Commander. The second committee, termed the "Appeal Committee," is
responsible for intermediate review. A detainee can appeal the issuance of an order at any time. Upon detention, the authorities must
inform the individual of the charges against him/her and of his/her
rights of appeal. Article 87(e) of the Security Order provides that:
... There shall be established an Appeal Committee, which
shall be appointed by the Commander of the Area. Its chairman
shall be a judge appointed under this Order, who is qualified to be
appointed a justice of the Appeal Court Martial. Such committee
shall consider every appeal in respect of an order under this Article,
and shall bring its recommendations before the Commander of the
Area.
...The Committee shall consider the detention of a person...
at least once every six months, whether the detainee has appealed
45
to it or not.
As in Israel proper, the decisions of the Area Commander are subject
to review by the High Court of Justice.
Administrative detainees in the occupied territories receive less
due process protection than administrative detainees in Israel proper.
Under article 87 of the Order Concerning Security Instructions,
administrative detention in the occupied territories is similar to administrative detention in Israel under the repealed Defense (Emergency) Regulations 111-112B. Article 87 provides individuals in the
occupied territories with less civilian control and judicial review of
detention than the Emergency Powers Law, 1979, affords individuals
in Israel.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Precedents
The Israeli Supreme Court applies formal and substantive standards in reviewing cases of administrative detention. The formal stand45 Article 87(e) of the Security Order Concerning Security Instructions, quoted in Hagar
supra note 4, at 288.

1981]

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

ard is whether the executive has complied with the technical requirements of the detention statute. The substantive criterion is whether
the authorities have exercised their discretion bona fide, based on
46
relevant factors, to achieve the intent of the law.
The High Court has been vigilant in preventing the government
from exceeding its formal authority. In Al-Karbutli v. Minister of
Defense, a case brought during the War of Independence in 1948, the
Supreme Court cancelled a Chief of Staff order on the grounds that
the advisory committee had not been established, which had been
mandated by Defense Regulation 111(4) to hear objections as to the
validity of confinement. The Court held that the operation of the
committee was a prerequisite to the exercise of the coercive power
afforded under Regulation 111(1). 47 Similarly, in Al Kuri v. the
Chief of Staff, the High Court annulled a Chief of Staff detention
order solely because, contrary to Regulation 111(1), the order did not
specify the place of confinement. In both of these cases, the Court
emphasized the need to maintain a balance between the protection of
the State and the defense of individual liberties. 48 In Kavage v.
Commissioner of Prisons, the Court upheld the right of a detainee to
be represented by an advocate of his/her choice. The Court overruled
the Commissioner's instructions limiting representation since the
Commissioner exceeded his authority under Regulation 111(6).49
The High Court has been much more hesitant to interfere with
the substantive discretion of the defense authorities. Instead, Israeli
case law has followed British precedents like Liversidge v. Anderson. 0 In Liversidge, the British House of Lords chose not to analyze
the factors considered by the Secretary of State when he confined an
individual accused of espionage under British Defense Regulation
18B. Regulation 18B authorized administrative detention when the
Secretary had reason to believe that a suspect was antagonistic toward
the State. The judges concluded that the Secretary's discretion was
absolute provided he acted in good faith. In Alyubi v. Minister of
Defense, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled:
The jurisdiction of this Court, in scrutinizing the competent authority's exercise of power emanating from the Defense (Emer46 Bracha, supra note 3, at 309.
41 H.C. 7/48, Al-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 5, construed in Bracha, supra note
3, at 309.
48 H.C. 95I49, Al Kuri v. Chief of Staff, 4 P.D. 34A, construed in Bracha, supra note 3, at
310.
49 H.C. 193/67, Kahvage v. Commissioner of Prisons, 21(2) P.D. 183, construed in Bracha,
supra note 3, at 310.
-o [1941] 3 All E.R. 388.
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. limited to examining whether the

authority exceeded its power under the law by virtue of which it
was empowered to act, if the said authority paid attention to the
factors stated in the same law, and whether the authority acted in
good faith. 5'
The High Court has continued to avoid interfering with the substantive discretion of competent authorites, as long as the executive has
52
acted bona fide.
The Court's control has also been restricted by the Right of
Privilege, under which the government has resisted disclosure of evidence for security reasons. However, courts now have jurisdiction to
hear in camera evidence related to state security since the Knesset
amended the Law of Evidence. The High Court, thus, has more
ability to probe into the substantive considerations and intent behind
53
the judgment of the executive.
B. Contemporary Cases
In 1980, the Israeli authorities imposed administrative detention
in two well publicized cases. In May, Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of
the Kach movement, was detained after security services concluded
that Kahane and an associate were planning vigilante action against
Arabs. The authorities brought Kahane before the President of the
District Court of Jerusalem within forty-eight hours, in compliance
with section 4(a) of the Emergency Powers Law. The District Court
President heard the defendant and ratified his confinement. The Kach
leader appealed to the Supreme Court as authorized by section 7(a) of
the new law. But the High Court affirmed the ruling of the court
below.5 4 In August, Prime Minister Begin, in his capacity as Minister
of Defense, cancelled the three-month detention order.5 5

51 H.C. 46/50, Alyubi v. Minister of Defence, 4 P.D. 220, 227, quoted in Bracha, supra note
3, at 313.
51 See H.C. 288/51, Atzlan v. Military Commander 9 P.D. 689; H.C. 188/53, Abu Gosh v.
Military Commander, 7 P.D. 941; H.C. 89/71, El Asmar v. Commander in Chief of the
Command Area, 25(2) P.D. 197; construed in Bracha, supra note 3, at 314, 315.
53 Bracha, supra note 3, at 316, 317.
5'
Personal communication with Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohn, July 28, 1980.
11 The controversial Kach leader was not released until mid-December, since he had to serve
seven and nine month sentences for trespassing and disturbing the peace in other cases. Begin
cancels Kahane detention order, Jerusalem Post International Edition. Aug. 10-16, 1980, at 8,
col. 4; Kahane is released from detention, Jerusalem Post International Edition. Dec. 14-20,
1980, at 4, col. 4.
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The procedural safeguards concerning administrative detention
are also applicable regarding administrative deportation. 56 On May
3, 1980, the mayors of Hebron and Halhoul (Fahd Kawasme and
Mohammed Milhem) and the Kadi of Hebron (Sheikh Tamimi) were
detained and deported for allegedly inciting the Arab population on
the West Bank. Their expulsion came hours after terrorists killed six
Jewish worshippers in Hebron. In mid-August, the Supreme Court,
by a two to one majority, rejected the petition of the deportees challenging their summary expulsion. Chief Justice Landau confirmed
that the authorities had failed to comply with their obligation to allow
the detainees to appeal to the military advisory committee before
deportation. But he ruled that the preclusion of the right to appeal did
not mean that the deportation orders were void, only that the orders
were voidable at the Court's discretion. To cure the defect in the
deportation procedure, the Court advised the detainees to appeal to
the military advisory review board. Justice Cohn, in dissent, argued
that the orders were void because of the defect in their execution. 57 On
October 14, after hearing Mayor Kawasma and Milhem, the military
advisory committee recommended confirmation of the expulsion orders. The Area Commander affirmed the recommendation. Prime
Minister Begin, in his capacity as Defense Minister, refused to intercede. Whereupon, the mayors re-appealed to the Supreme Court. On
December 5, 1980, the justices in a two to one decision, reconfirmed
the legal authority of the military commanders to deport the mayors.
The Court, however, recommended that the cabinet reconsider the
mayors' ouster from a political perspective. The ministerial security
committee of the cabinet reconsidered the deportation, but voted to
re-expel Kawasma and Milhem. In view of the High Court's historical
commitment to protecting the procedural due process rights of suspects under the Defense Regulations, the deportations appear void.
The prejudice to the mayors resulting from the initial denial of their
appeal right was irreversible. As Justice Cohn reasoned: "In a country
of law there is no consideration of security, politics, ideology, or any
other that can justify a breach of law by the authorities." 58

See Defense (Emergency) Regulations 112, 112(4), supra note 29; Emergency Powers Law
section 12, supra note 36.
57 The laws regulating administrative detention in the occupied territories applied to the
cases of Mayors Kawasma and Milhem since the alleged incitement to riot occurred in the West
Bank towns of Hebron and Halhoul. Richardson, Court "No" on Hebron Deportees, Jerusalem
Post International Edition, Aug. 24-30, 1980, at 7, col. 1.
58 Id.; Court Weighs Ex-Mayors' Pleas, Jerusalem Post International Edition. Nov. 2-8,
1980, at 4, col 4; Landau, Why the Two Mayors Were Exiled Again, Jerusalem Post International Edition. Dec. 7-13, 1980 at 1, col. 2.
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VI. PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES AND THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION

Several international organizations such as the United Nations
Special Committee and Amnesty International have charged that Israel's use of administrative detention in the West Bank and Gaza
violates articles 78 and 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 9 The Fourth
Geneva Convention applies only in cases of belligerent occupation to
protect the reversionary rights of a legitimate sovereign ousted from
its territory by an aggressive foreign power. Article 78 of the Fourth
Convention allows an occupying power to use administrative detention "for imperative reasons of security," provided, inter alia, that the
defendent's right of appeal is preserved and confinement is reviewed
every six months.60 Article 6(3) prohibits administrative detention
one year after the "general close of military operations," unless such
detention is allowed by another article of the Agreement. 6' The
United Nations Special Committee, National Lawyers Guild, and
others maintain that Israel violates the Convention since it detains
individuals thirteen years after the cessation of general military opera62

tions.

The Israeli government rejects the de jure applicability of the
Fourth Geneva Convention to the administered territories, but ac59 Articles 6(3) and 78, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S., No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
cited as the Fourth Convention]. In 1968, the United Nations General Assembly established a
Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population
of the Occupied Territories. Israel has objected to the Committee on the grounds that it lacks
independence and objectivity. None of the three members (Yugoslavia, Ceylon, Somalia) maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Shefi, The Protection of Human Rights in Areas Administered by Israel, 3 I.Y.H.R., 337, 339 (1973). See also Cohn, InternationalFact-FindingProcesses
and the Rule of Law, 18 International Commission of Jurists Review 40 (1977).
10 Article 78, Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 59, states:
If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to
take measures concerning protected persons, it may, at most, subject them to assigned residence or internment. Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the
Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This
procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. In the event of
the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodic review, if possible every six
months by a competent body set up by the Occupying Power.
Ok Article 6(3), supra note 59, provides:
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall
cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying
Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation . . . by the provisions of
the following Articles of the present Convention: I to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52,
53, 59, 61 to 77, 143.
12 National Lawyers Guild, supra note 25, at 85-91.
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cepts its obligations to comply with the humanitarian principles of the
Convention. 3 Under the Palestine Mandate (1922), the League of
Nations charged Great Britain with the responsibility of furthering a
"Jewish National Home" in the area of Palestine, which included the
West Bank (i.e., Judaea, Samaria, and East Jerusalem). In 1948, the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan invaded the West Bank, and on April
24, 1950, Jordan annexed the area. The only countries to recognize
the annexation were Pakistan and Great Britain (in part) .64 Although
Egypt formerly claimed jurisdiction over the Gaza district, Egypt has
never claimed that the residents of Gaza are Egyptian citizens. In
Israel's view Egypt and Jordan do not have a reversionary right to the
territories because they were never the legitimate sovereigns. Israel
argues that it took possession of the West Bank and Gaza in self-defense after the 1967 War. Israel contends that its title to the land is at
least as valid as that of Jordan and Egypt. The Israeli government,
therefore, maintains that the Fourth Convention does not apply to the
territories because it is not a belligerent occupant since the legal status
of the West Bank and Gaza has not been resolved.
Israel also argues that, even if the Geneva Convention is applicable to the territories, administrative detention is permissible on the
basis of article 64 of the Convention. Article 64 provides that the
penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force. Jordan
employed the administrative detention provisions of the Defense Regulations (1945) against local residents throughout its rule of the West
Bank. In addition, Egypt used administrative detention in the Gaza
district under the Orders of the Military Governor. 65 Israel has continued to apply the administrative detention sections of the Defense
Regulations in the West Bank and Gaza. Pursuant to article 64, the
penal laws of the territories regarding administrative detention have
remained in force. Article 64 of the Convention has priority over
article 6(3) since article 6(3) specifically excludes article 64 from the
provisions that terminate one year after the close of military operations. The Israeli government thus maintains that article 64 allows the
continued use of the detention provisions of the Defense Regulations
without contradicting any norms of the Geneva Convention." °
63 For example, article 75 of the Convention authorizes capital punishment. Israel, however,
has never imposed the death penalty in the territories, despite the fact that numerous saboteurs
directly implicated in the killing of soldiers and civilians have been tried and convicted. A
Twelve Year Survey: 1967-1977, supra note 44, at 11. Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, I I.Y.H.R. 262, 271 (1971).
4 Shamgar, supra note 63, at 264, 265. See also note 5 supra.
65 Id.; Pach, supra note 5, at 224, 225.
" Shamgar, supra note 63, at 274, 275.
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THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

The Emergency Powers Law (1979), if properly administered,
presents a reasonable balance between the security interests of the
state in times of crisis and the liberty interests of the individual. The
new law applies only in states of emergency as declared by the Knesset. It transfers most detention powers from military to civilian authorities, and strengthens judicial review. 7 It is hoped that the
courts will actively scrutinize the authorities' compliance with the
formal and substantive requirements of the new law. When the executive violates the due process rights of defendants, as in the case of the
Hebron area deportees, the High Court should cancel detention or
deportation orders.68
The Attorney General of Israel has indicated that the provisions
of the Emergency Powers Law are being extended, with minor alterations, to the administered territories. Pending a final disposition of the
legal status of the occupied territories, the Israeli government should
apply section 4(c) of the new law to the West Bank and Gaza. This
would require the Area Commander to present the detainee before the
military court of competent jurisdiction within forty-eight hours of
detention. The military court should have the power to limit, void, or
ratify the order. If a detainee is not brought before the court within
forty-eight hours, he/she should be released. The military court would
replace the area advisory committee now responsible for initial review
of detention. Israel should also apply section 5 of the new law to
require the military court or the military appeal committee to review
detentions on a three month, rather than a six month basis. These
changes would increase due process safeguards for defendants without
compromising security interests.
Some advocates favor complete repeal of administrative detention, arguing that the vast power granted to the State makes abuse of
discretion inevitable. If the State wishes to detain a suspected terrorist, it should charge him/her with a criminal offense (e.g., incitement
or espionage). If the prosecution cannot establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial, the defendant should be acquitted. If necessary, the Knesset could enact special rules of evidence that require
corroboration, but also protect disclosure of confidential information.
These advocates.,maintain that the individual's liberty interest is of
such gravity that due process requires the state to justify confinement
by normal criminal proceedings. 69
67 Bracha, supra note 3, at 322.

" Such a decision would be consistent with the Al-Karbutli, supra note 47, line of cases.
69 Dershowitz, Preventive Detentionof Citizens Duringa NationalEmergency-A Comparison between Israel and the United States, 1 I.Y.H.R. 321 (1971).
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In a condition of armed hostility, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, maiming and killing are common occurrences. Under these
tragic circumstances, does a nation provide more protection to citizens
and belligerents by extending normal criminal law and procedure to
security cases, enacting emergency defense legislation, or refusing to
do either? If a state extends normal criminal law and procedure or
passes an administrative detention statute, it establishes a rule of law
to which the police and military authorities are accountable. If a state
fails to extend criminal law and procedure or to enact legislation,
police and military authorities may act arbitrarily. When a state of
emergency ceases to exist in Israel, the Knesset should abolish administrative detention. 70 At present, however, administrative detention
under the Emergency Powers Law if only used in extraordinary cases
strikes a reasonable balance between the security interests of the state
71
and the due process rights of detainees.
70

As discussed supra in note 13, the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace

Treaty (March 26, 1979) offer a major initiative toward achieving an equitable and enduring
resolution of Arab-Israeli hostilities.
"1 While this comment conditionally supports the use of administrative detention by the
Israeli government, it does not by implication advocate every "self-defense" measure taken by
the State. The Israeli government does not have a compelling interest in injuring or killing
non-Israeli civilians who neither actively threaten to destroy the State nor terrorize its citizens.

